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THE CUTTING EDGE
This panel was convened at 10:45 a.m., Friday, March 27, by its moderator, Anthea Roberts
of the London School of Economics, who introduced the panelists: Karen Knop of the
University of Toronto, Ralf Michaels of Duke University School of Law, Gabriella Blum
of Harvard Law School, and Katerina Linos of the Harvard Society of Fellows.
INTRODUCTION
By Anthea Roberts*
The Cutting Edge panel was an idea developed by the 2009 ASIL Program Committee
and, in particular, Oona Hathaway, who proposed and took the leading role in organizing
this panel. Many programs at conferences draw on previously published work and thus lag
one or two years behind some of the most innovative contemporary research in the field.
As a step towards identifying and giving exposure to exciting current projects, we made a
general call for proposals based on unpublished works-in-progress.
The response to this call was extremely positive. We received more than sixty submissions
for just three spots on the Cutting Edge Panel. The following proposals were selected because
they represent interesting and original work across a variety of fields and evidence a range
of theoretical approaches. The first uses a conflicts-of-law approach to analyze clashes
between international and domestic law; the second questions a basic assumption in the laws
of war before proposing a significant reform; while the final one draws on empirical work
to test claims about norm diffusion.
I hope that you enjoy these presentations. Given the competitive selection process, and
the resulting quality of the contributions chosen, I am sure that it will not be long until full
versions of all three papers are published elsewhere.
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS: A CONFLICT OF
LAWS APPROACH
By Karen Knop,t Ralf Michaels, I and Annelise Riles
In international law textbooks, the question "is international law law?" is presented at
the beginning as a matter of jurisprudence-Austin's command theory of law and Hart's
discussion of why international law differs from morality. But it is neither in the preliminary
nor in the abstract sense that the question now arises most acutely. It is in the treatment of
international law by domestic courts-a concrete practical setting-and the question is
contextual in form: is a particular type of international law law for a particular purpose in
a particular domestic legal system? Accounts of how domestic courts do, or should, treat
international law are not presented as answers to this question, but of course they are
propositions about whether it counts as law and, if not, then what its nature is exactly.
In a recent article, Neil Walker draws up a list of very general and disparate concepts to
describe the relationship between international and domestic law: institutional incorporation,
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system recognition, normative coordination, environmental overlap, and sympathetic consid-
eration.' Strangely absent from his list of concepts-and from the debate more generally-
is the discipline for which the nature of other legal systems and the nature of their jurisdiction,
laws, and judgments vis-a-vis the domestic legal system, are precisely the bread-and-butter
issues. This discipline is conflict of laws, or private international law as it is more often
known outside the United States. Although scholars of international law in domestic courts
occasionally borrow one or another idea from conflict of laws,2 the parallel between the two
has not been systematically explored.
Why the neglect of an obvious parallel? One reason may lie with the traditional scope of
conflict of laws. Conflicts is often narrowly understood as a discipline with a certain method
(in the United States, this is usually either interest analysis or the most significant relationship
test) and a certain policy objective (comity). In our view, conflicts should be seen more
broadly as the discipline developed to deal with conflicts between laws, without necessarily
being committed to any particular method or any particular policy. In this light, its relevance
for conflicts between international law and domestic law, and their interrelationship more
generally, becomes apparent.
Other likely reasons why conflict of laws is overlooked concern the state of the field; for
one, its high degree of technicality. Brainerd Currie spoke disparagingly of a "conflict-of-
laws machine": a court simply presses what it thinks are the proper levers and then sits back
complacently while the machine grinds out the result.3 Another reason relates to the field's
abundance of successive theories, critiques, and revisions, which continue to coexist in the
courts and the literature: vested rights theory, local law theory, governmental interest analysis,
the theory of the better law, and so on. Prosser notoriously described conflict of laws as a
"dismal swamp ... inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysteri-
ous matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon." 4 In contrast, we will suggest why
both the machine-like quality of conflicts and the multitude of theories which Prosser deemed
a swamp actually figure among the advantages of a conflict-of-laws approach to international
law in domestic courts.
The promise of a conflicts perspective is threefold. First, it offers ways to respect the
nature of international law as law, without simplifying that nature by characterizing it exactly
as domestic law. Intriguingly, Joseph Weiler's editorial on the Kadi decision all but makes
this case for the parallel with conflicts.5 In Kadi, the European Court of Justice partly annulled
the European Community's (EC) implementation of UN Security Council anti-terrorism
resolutions requiring states to freeze the financial assets of individuals and entities associated
with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network, and the Taliban, as designated by the Sanctions
Committee of the Security Council. It held that the implementing measures violated fundamen-
tal human rights protected by the EC legal order. Weiler criticizes the Court for its "bold
and unsophisticated assertion" that the EC measures would in reality not be treated any
' See Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative
Orders, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 373 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 Mo.
L. REv. 1151, 1178-9 (2008); Ralf Michaels, Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudication System: Three
Questions to the Panelists, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253 (2008); Beth Van Schaack, Boumediene and Choice
of Law (June 13, 2008), available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2008/06/13/boumediene-and-choice-of-law/>; Arthur
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995); Ernest A. Young,
Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002).
Brainerd Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv. 719, 727 (1961).
4 William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 895, 896 (2008).
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differently than had they been autonomous measures adopted by the EC Council of Ministers
rather than measures originating from the Security Council. Although Weiler does not propose
a better approach, he specifies that such an approach would require a hermeneutic that
recognizes what he calls the "double jurisdiction situation." Our point is that conflict of
laws provides such a hermeneutic. In other words, conflicts is not simply one more solution
to a well-known problem-yet another concept to be added to Walker's list. Rather, conflict
of laws is a better formulation of the problem.
Seeing the parallel with conflict of laws brings a second advantage to the international
law in domestic courts debate: namely, a wealth of experience that can enrich and refine the
debate. The "dismal swamp" proves to be a productive biosphere. Indeed, the theories,
critiques, and revisions that mark the field of conflicts have already played out much of the
debate that is now occurring in the context of international law in domestic courts, giving
it an altogether familiar ring.
Finally, the parallel with conflicts changes international law in domestic courts from a
specific problem addressed by international and constitutional lawyers into a general problem
of relativism-which, we argue, conflict of laws is uniquely positioned to address. Here, the
technicality of conflict of laws is not a shortcoming but a strength. The "conflict-of-laws
machine," we argue, is a way to reach a result without yielding to arbitrariness in the face
of otherwise insurmountable complexity. Accordingly, we describe our larger project 6 as
"theory through technique." This project will use private international law as a way of
thinking through problems of legal, political, and cultural relativism,7 including multicultur-
alism and transitional justice, as well as international law in domestic courts.
What exactly does it mean to say that there is a parallel between conflict of laws and
international law in domestic courts? Like conflicts, international law in domestic courts
concerns relations between laws. Moreover, although not ordinarily described in this way,
international law and national law each have what we might call their own conflicts rules:
rules that determine whether a case with links to more than one jurisdiction is governed by
the law of the forum or the law of one of those other jurisdictions. Thus, international law
has rules that determine when it will take account of domestic law. For example, Article 27
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which says that "a party may not invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty," is
recognizable as a negative conflicts rule determining non-applicability of domestic law. And
Article 46, which makes an exception to Article 27 when a state's consent to be bound
amounts to a manifest violation of a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance, is
identifiable as a conflicts rule triggered by the state's manifestly greater interest. States, by
contrast, have their own constitutional, statutory, and judge-made rules that determine the
effect given to international law. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI, paragraph 2, of the
U.S. Constitution, for instance, can be understood as a choice-of-law provision: its decision
to treat treaties as (supreme) domestic law parallels the local law theory of conflict of laws,
which posits that judges always apply domestic rules of law, but sometimes create these in
accordance with foreign law.
6 See thus far Karen Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 309 (2008); Annelise
Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (2008); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural
Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BuFF. L. REv. 973 (2005).
See Annelise Riles, The Empty Place: Legal Formalities and the Cultural State, in THE PLACE OF LAW 43
(Austin Sarat et al. eds. 2003).
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Given the complex debate that has developed on international law in domestic courts, we
cannot give more than a quick snapshot of our approach here. In our larger work in progress,
we analyze a broad range of the scholarship and case law. By way of a snapshot, we offer
a comparison of our approach with a far-reaching constitutionalist framework developed by
Mattias Kumm,8 which lends itself especially well to a comparison because it is comprehensive
and detailed, as well as bold.
Kumm rejects an all or nothing approach to international law in domestic courts in favor
of a more complex rule/exception or presumption/rebuttal framework. In his view, a formal
principle of international legality requires that international law prima facie be applicable
domestically. This presumption is subject to rebuttal based on three other principles: the
jurisdictional principle of subsidiarity, the procedural principle of adequate participation and
accountability, and the substantive principle of achieving reasonable outcomes.
While Kumm's proposal makes an important contribution to the international law debate,
his arguments have long been recognized, debated, and refined in conflict of laws. The
impetus for Kumm's framework-the reality of overlapping jurisdictions-has been the very
raison-d'tre of conflicts doctrine since the inception of the field. The elements of his
framework also echo conflicts. For example, the arguments Kumm gives for the presumption
that international law applies domestically are familiar ones in the battery of modern conflicts
analysis: the "needs of the international system" and the "protection of justified expecta-
tions" both appear in the core provision of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, its
§ 6. Perhaps most interestingly, his argument that a strong international system bolsters,
rather than compromises, democratic legitimacy at the local level because it protects the
interests of local minorities, resembles the so-called "false conflicts" analysis-the situation
in which no real conflict of laws exists because both jurisdictions share a common interest
in seeing the law applied.
From a conflicts perspective, Kumm's argument that the presumption in favor of applying
international law can be rebutted if the outcome is sufficiently unacceptable is also familiar.
Kumm maintains that this exception should be narrowly tailored although he provides no
specific criteria. In conflicts, this is the "public policy exception," in which otherwise locally
applicable foreign law is nevertheless not enforced because to do so would violate local
public policy. For international lawyers confronted with Security Council anti-terrorism
resolutions such as those at issue in Kadi, the public policy exception may feel like a
progressive step. In conflict of laws, however, the public policy exception is perceived as a
throw-back to an older, more formalist doctrinal era that has thankfully been whittled down
over the years as the field has developed more technically sophisticated ways of handling
the problem of political and cultural conflict caused by the domestic application of foreign
law that differs in substantial ways from the forum's laws and norms.
The core of Kumm's argument is a cost-benefit analysis focusing on the value of interna-
tional law in overcoming collective action problems that impede localities from doing domesti-
cally what is in all of their interests. Global administrative governance is not actually so
disturbing from a democratic legitimacy point of view, Kumm argues, if we realize that
domestic law has also become far more technocratic and bureaucratically attenuated from
the democratic process. The parallel experience of twentieth century conflicts doctrine in
8 See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 907 (2004).
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the United States with technocratic approaches to problems of overlapping jurisdiction sug-
gests why the approach Kumm advocates here looks appealing. Kumm casts aside "unhelp-
ful" questions of legal doctrine and of politics such as sovereignty and, instead, forcefully
redeploys the legal realist image of the judge as a kind of super-administrator, who has
already proven her ability to handle a myriad details of politics and policy, that was at the
heart of the twentieth century conflicts revolution in the United States.
But if this move feels like a leap forward, the twentieth century experience in conflicts
also suggests the limits of such an approach. Kumm's turn to cost-benefit analysis is, in
fact, a version of the balancing of governmental interests often used to resolve conflicts of
laws. The problem with such technocratic analysis in conflicts has been that efforts to open
the analysis up to bureaucratic balancing quickly took on a rigidity of their own. A laudable
attempt to broaden questions of which law should apply to an inquiry into the underlying
interests involved, for example, rapidly devolved into "counting contacts" between ajurisdic-
tion and a given dispute.
Thus, the twentieth century conflicts experience suggests that the technocratic approach
is not ultimately smart or humble enough. It satisfies no one in the end because it exposes,
in too stark a way, the politics of judicial decision-making. There seems to be no basis for
bureaucratic judgment and hence consumers of the decision are left feeling that the decision
to apply or not to apply international law domestically is arbitrary and politically motivated.
Our larger suggestion, then, is that perhaps the mishaps, the bumps in the road faced by
American conflicts doctrine, may help to identify-in advance-the difficulties some of the
proposals currently floated in the international law in domestic courts debate may face. The
strength of conflicts, ironically, is that its starting assumption about overlapping jurisdictions
and conflicts between political interests and cultural viewpoints demands that the doctrine
face the arbitrariness of its own underlying assumptions head on. Most of the numerous
methods and critiques proceed from an honest appraisal of the problem of cultural or political
relativism at the core of the act of judging. The complexity of conflict of laws is a consequence
of the complexity of the problems it sets out to resolve. A domestic court applying international
law is not objective in its determination of whether or not international law should apply,
conflicts tells us: it represents the views of the domestic polity first. What one should make
of this reality, then, is a separate matter.
So, how to address this reality? Does conflicts offer us an alternative way to think about
the problem? We want to avoid two positions: on the one hand, that of the formalist doctrinalist
who denies or avoids the problem of relativism and, on the other hand, that of the political
or cultural theorist who, depending on her theoretical commitments, either contends that the
conflict can be "resolved" through some rational set of political commitments (always
suspiciously close to her own) or who abandons any hope of resolution in favor of endless
circles of critique.
The alternative that conflict of laws offers, we suggest, is "theory through technique."
Conflicts allows us to turn a large political conflict into a narrowly tailored and technically
specific one-not to avoid or deny it but, to the contrary, to be able to address it. We do
not resolve the question of whether international law applies in all circumstances, or even
whether this international law applies in all circumstances. We seek to answer only the
question of whether this international law applies to these litigants with respect to these
specific legal rights and this particular dispute. For example, whereas countless scholars ask
whether international law is democratically legitimate, we ask whether its application in the
particular context is justified. This does not make the question small; it makes it concrete.
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This submission to what we might call the constraint of legal form9 is, of course, always
partial. But are we merely advocating a return to formalism? Don't you know, critics will
say, that the issues cannot be cordoned off in this way, that they are all interrelated? Don't
you know that the technical doctrines of conflicts are in fact highly manipulable? Our answer
is that we wish to deploy these doctrines in what, following Lon Fuller and before him Hans
Vaihinger,10 we call an "as if" mentality-a device for overcoming political conflict even
as it is always understood to be nothing but a device. "As if' refers to knowledge that is
consciously false and hence, precisely for this reason, irrefutable. The construct of the line
is indispensable to mathematics, for example, but a line in the mathematical sense is clearly
imaginary because it exists in only one dimension and is thus infinitely thin, unlike a
hypothesis which can be disproven or a presumption which can be rebutted. Yet this imaginary
construct, understood by all sophisticated users to be imaginary, allows entire fields of
mathematics and geometry to proliferate.
This is precisely the opposite of blind formalism, then. Between the Scylla of blind
formalism and the Charybdis of open policy balancing, between the utopia of systemic
integration and the dystopia of head-on political collision, a machine like the conflict-of-
laws machine might well lead the way.
THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE "LESSER EVIL"
By Gabriella Blum*
Why is it that the laws of war or as they are otherwise known, international humanitarian
law (IHL), allow no justification for breaking the law even when such conduct would actually
produce less humanitarian harm than following the law? Why would a defendant who violated
IHL in order to save lives be convicted of war crimes?
My interest in this puzzle arose as the Israeli Supreme Court handed down its judgment
on the "Early Warning Procedure" that was employed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
in the West Bank. Under the Procedure, the IDF would approach a neighbor of a suspected
Palestinian militant and ask him to request the suspect to surrender quietly to the security
forces. If the suspect refused, the neighbor would then attempt to clear the suspect's residence
from its other inhabitants. The stated goal of the Procedure was to reduce potential casualties,
among both the security forces and nearby civilians, in case the arrest operation turned
violent. Despite some evidence that the Procedure was in fact effective in reducing civilian
casualties, the Supreme Court ruled the Procedure unlawful under international law. The
Court reasoned that IHL imposed a strict prohibition on the reliance on local civilians by
an Occupying Power for security operations, for which there was no exception.
The prohibition cited by the Israeli Supreme Court is but one instance of IHL's absolutist
stance. Others include the prohibitions on mercy killings, assassination of rogue leaders, the
use of non-lethal chemical weapons, or the intentional killing of any civilian-even where
such actions are taken with the attempt to minimize humanitarian harm. The claim that
certain acts, now considered war crimes, might actually lead to the saving of innocent lives-
9 See MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE Gir: PROBLEMS WITH WOMEN AND PROBLEMS WITH SOCIETY
IN MELANESIA 180-82 (1988).
10 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF": A SYSTEM OF
THE THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (1924). See also, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy,
Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 223,227 (2006).
* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School.
